Democratic Support in Taiwan Revisited: The China Factor*

Fang-Yu Chen

Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Soochow University

Abstract

In the recent decade, the global retreat of democratic support-especially among younger generations - and authoritarian diffusion becomes salient issues. In particular, the contested model of "democracy" comes into focus between the U.S. and China strategic competition. This study explores the democratic support in Taiwan, where it is often ranked as a top liberal democracy in Asia but also a frontline of the great power competition. We focus on the China factor, testing whether citizens' evaluation on China, especially the negative impacts, is associated with people's assessment of democracy. This study utilizes the China Impact Survey (2016) and Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS 2021) to examine levels of democratic support in Taiwan. In the data of 2016, I find that the China factors become significant in shaping political attitudes. People who value national sovereignty and have

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negative evaluation on China's government tend to express support for democracy. Furthermore, the data of 2021 demonstrates that democratic support is significantly associated with evaluations of China and the U.S. That is, the U.S.-China competition and the fight for legitimacy between democracies and autocracies in global politics do have impacts on democratic support at the individual level.

Keywords: Democratic Support, Authoritarian Diffusion, Democratic Recession, China Factor, Generational Gap

I. Introduction

The legitimacy of liberal democracy seems to be in a crisis, as studies find that citizens' support for democracy is in decline worldwide, especially among younger generations (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Chu et al. 2020; Foa and Mounk 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019). In the latest research, Open Society Foundations (2023) finds that among people aged 18-35, 42% support military rule, and 35% support the idea that a political strongman who is not checked and balanced by the legislature is a better way to rule. It seems like the faith in the key values and institutions of democracy, including fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law, is globally in retreat. This reflects the fact that liberal democracy is facing a severe crisis while political rights and civil liberties both deteriorated to the lowest levels in decades (Freedom House 2022). One has not only witnessed the rise of autocratic strongmen such as Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.[1] But also in many democracies, especially in advanced economies, various populist parties are promoting agendas to bypass existing political institutions, dismantling democratic norms and practices (Kendall-Taylor, and Frantz 2016; Pappas 2019).

While Taiwan's performance of democratic institutions is among the highest-rated in Asia,[2] the public support for democracy in Taiwan could also be influenced by the trend of

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[1] See the discussion of authoritarian diffusion or autocracy promotion (e.g., Yakouchyk 2019).

[2] For example, the Freedom House rated Taiwan with highest level of political rights and civil liberties and with the aggregate score of 94 out of 100 in 2023.

democratic support in Asia. This study utilizes data from the China Impact Survey 2016 (Chang 2018) and Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study 2021 (Chen 2021) to examine democratic support in Taiwan. I investigate whether or not Taiwanese citizens' views on democracy can resist the global trend of distrust of the democratic systems and the significant appeals from China.

This research aims to contribute to the discussion of the authoritarian diffusion effect. The backslide of democratic legitimacy and support for authoritarian alternatives are sometimes two sides of the same picture. China is now the template for the "Beijing consensus" - illiberal political institutions and the state-led economic policies dominated by a strong ruling party (Halper 2010) - using its "sharp power" to shape public opinions in favor of the authoritarian model (Cardenal et al. 2017; Walker 2018). Taiwan is geographically and politically located at the frontline of rising China, and thus a typical case for testing how the China factor influences citizens' political behaviors. The losing track of the democratic support in Taiwan may need an update while there lacks study on how the China factor influences democratic support.

In the following sessions, I will firstly discuss the conceptualization and operationalization of democratic support. Then I focus on how people's evaluation on China's impact on Taiwan influence democratic support. The research design part introduces the data and variables, followed by the analyses of two waves of data. Results of both studies show that the China factor stands out as the most important factor on citizens' attitudes of democracy.

II. Literature

A. Conceptualizing Democratic Support

According to Easton's (1965) seminal work, democratic support is defined as "a preference for a system of government with free elections and many parties over alternative (authoritarian) forms of government." In general, democratic support at the individual level can be measured by direct questions on evaluating the political system or indirect questions on attitudes toward core liberal-democratic values and institutions (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). Mattes and Bratton (2007) illustrate this as one of the essential components of "demand for democracy," and it is widely used in cross-national research.

This project adopts a direct measurement in the existing surveys, asking individuals to choose whether democracy is always the best political system, or sometimes authoritarianism is better. In many surveys, it provides a three-choice question: With which of the following statements do you agree most? (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; (2) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; and (3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or nondemocratic regime. This paper adopts this conceptualization and measurement: Democratic support mainly counts those who choose the first option-democracy is the best system for the government.

Another similar approach is to ask people's opinion on democratic regime vis-à-vis authoritarian alternatives (Erhardt,

Wamsler, and Freitag 2021; Malka et al. 2022). For example, in the World Value Survey and European Value Survey, there are questions asking people directly whether alternative types of political systems are good or bad ways of governing their country. The alternatives to democracy are "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections," "experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country," "army rule," and compared to "a democratic political system." This approach directly asks people's preferred forms of government between democracy and autocracy.

However, while the term democracy is highly supported worldwide, it consists of a variety of ambiguous attitudes toward the representative, social, and political institutions (Ulbricht 2018). There are various methods of measuring democratic support, because the perceptions of democratic institutions and values in different regions show considerable variations (Canache 2012; Cho 2015; Mattes and Bratton 2007). The most common conceptualizations of democracy include electoral, liberal, and redistributive aspects (Chapman et al. 2024). The basic definition is procedural, as people evaluate the format of elections and political participation. Some people define democracy as an intrinsic value, which features individual freedom and human rights; while others view democracy as instrumental, focusing on the results of governance such as economic development, wealth re-distribution, and governments' effectiveness (Lu and Chu 2021).

Therefore, some studies utilize multiple indicators of either direct or indirect democratic support, especially people's attitudes toward democratic values. For example, Claassen (2020) measures

"democratic mood" by using the Bayesian model to pool all of direct democratic support questions in multiple waves of surveys. Chang (2011) uses factor analysis of several survey items to construct indices of direct and indirect support. Recent scholarship also uses similar concepts such as public citizenship, which asks people on several questions about their beliefs on political participation.

It is indeed worth exploring deeper on the conceptualization of preferences for democracy (König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022). However, this study uses a simple measurement due to several reasons.[3] First, many scholars have tested the validity of this measurement. For example, Durán and Trillas (2020) mentions that most surveys of political behavior use the standard three-choice question for democratic support. They utilize data from the Latinobarómetro and find that the simple measurement yields similar result to the alternatives. They use other measurement as robustness check, which is a common practice for similar research (Ariely 2015; Gerber and Chapman 2018). Second, because the limit choices of survey items, sometimes researchers have to make a tradeoff. According to previous studies, using a simple measurement seems to be acceptable, although not perfect. In general, the simple question focuses on the comparison between democracy and autocracy. In Taiwan's context, many previous studies also use the same measurement (Chu, Huang, and Chang 2016; Hsiao and Yu 2020).

[3] The author thanks the anonymous reviewer to raise the issue of multiple conceptualization.

B. Review of Studies in Taiwan

Among all the studies on Taiwanese citizens' democratic support, the generational gap is the most discussed factor, while there are only two studies focusing on other factors, including economic inequality and perceived polarization of the party politics. For the most studied theme, the age and generational gap, extant studies on Taiwanese democratic support have mixed results, no matter using the simple measurement or the multiple-item measurement. Appendix 1 summarizes the results of generation and age in the studies of Taiwanese democratic support.

When measured directly, democracy is less supported among the younger generation in Huang's (2011) study. However, Yu and Hsiao (2007) find that the post-1992 generation (those who are younger than 20 - the year for suffrage - in 1992) are more supportive of democracy. At the same time, the young people also express more support for the alternative, authoritarianism, than the older counterparts (besides, people can choose "no difference" in the survey). Chang (2011) contends that there is a U-shape relationship between age and democratic support, while the youngest cohorts and the older cohorts tend to support democracy over alternatives. Despite the contradictory findings, as for the trend of democratic support, Yu and Hsiao (2007) and Chang (2011) both point out that the gap between different generations is becoming smaller. That is, they illustrate an optimistic view of rising democratic support on average.

On the other hand, by the multiple measurement of democratic values, it also shows mixed results. Lin (2015) finds that younger

cohorts have higher democratic values, but Chang (2011), Chen (2010) and Pao (2009) have opposite observations. For example, Pao (2009) points out that younger generation students tend to believe in a strong leadership, a mixture of anti-democratic value, while Chang (2011) illustrates a reverse U-shape that young and elder generations are more skeptical about democratic values. Moreover, Lin (2015) and Chen (2010) specifically point out that the socialization during the 1990s, the period of democratic transition and beginning of general elections, lead to an anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic generation. The latest research, Lin (2021), shows that age is positively related to democratic support. In sum, the literature tells us that: (1) age and democratic values may have non-linear relationships, while specific series of events shape political attitudes of a whole generation; and (2) contrary to the direct democratic support, there is no convergence of attitudes between generations on democratic values (Chang 2011).

Besides the factor of the generation, there are two essential factors in the previous studies. First, Hsiao and Yu (2020) find that in Taiwan, citizens who have more polarized evaluations toward the two major parties are less supportive of the democratic system. This is because people become frustrated with the constant conflict between the two parties, leading them to feel that the entire system seems incapable of effectively solving problems and responding to the needs of the people.

Second, Lin (2021) illustrates that people's democratic support is associated with assessments on socio-economic inequality, but the positive relationship is not stable. When people feel that the level of economic inequality is high, they tend to support a democratic

system that grants ordinary individuals more political rights to achieve greater redistribution. However, this relationship is often weakened depending on their assessment of the economic outlook.

This study aims at filling in three major limits of the extant studies. First, the data is not up-to-date. In the past decade, there are only two studies (Hsiao and Yu 2020; Lin 2021) using data collected in 2018, while the last one among others uses data before 2010. We are thus unable to compare with the pattern and downturn of democratic support in the global context in recent years. Second, as the result is mixed, we are not certain about whether younger generations are more doubtful about democracy like the global trend (Foa and Mounk 2016) and in advanced democracies such as the latest findings in the United States (henceforth, U.S.) (Claassen and Magalhães 2023). Furthermore, we need more discussion on the explanatory factors beyond the generational gap. So far, there are limited studies overall and we need more efforts to find out how the rise of China and the great power competition influence people's assessment of democracy. The China factor has not yet been thoroughly examined.

C. The China Factor

The rise of China, along with its growing political and economic power, has had a significant impact on the global political and economic order. Generally speaking, when we discuss the influence of the "China factor" on a country, it often focuses on how China uses its economic power to bring about political consequences, known as "using business to steer politics." According to Wu Jieh-min, the China factor "refers to the process

by which the People's Republic of China (henceforth, PRC) government utilizes capital and related resources to absorb other countries and 'offshore districts' into its sphere of economic influence, thereby making them economically dependent on China in order to further facilitate its political influence (Wu 2016, 430)."

Since the 1990s, Taiwan and China have developed close economic ties, and this relationship has profound impacts on politics. For example, the proportion of Taiwanese exports to China has consistently been nearly 40% in the recent decade, and more than 60% of outward investments from Taiwan have gone to China since 1991.[4] At the same time, China still holds an ultimate goal of "unification," claiming Taiwan as a renegade province, and its leaders always reiterate that they will not rule out the possibility of using force to achieve the goal. The PRC government establishes an economic dependence structure for Taiwan and offers privileged status and material treatments to Taiwanese businesspeople, political figures, media, and specific groups. By purchasing products, investing in local firms, and through the cross-Strait capital, the Chinese government tries to influence various spheres in Taiwan including enterprise behavior, government decision making, media coverage, public opinion and cultural activities (Fong, Wu, and Nathan 2021). Some of the local actors thus become the "local collaborators" for Beijing (Cook 2023), help spread China-friendly propaganda. For Taiwan, not only the government but also the civil society have to manage the "trading with enemy" scenario (Lin

[4] Statistics of cross-Strait trade can be found on the website of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council: http://www.mac.gov.tw.

2016; Yen, Kay, and Chen 2021), while China keeps running the strategy of "using business to steer politics".

The rise of China's influence directly links to Taiwanese citizens' views on cross-Strait relations and political behaviors (Sheng and Liao 2017). In the studies of Taiwan's party politics, Wu (2016) mentions a trend of adding variables related to the China factor into the survey research, while China's influence has penetrated into Taiwanese citizens' political behaviors. One of the first studies is Wu (2005), in which be proposed a "bread versus romance" metaphor to illustrate how Taiwanese identity is influenced by Chinese economic attraction. Subsequent studies found that people with positive attitudes towards more open cross-Strait trade are more likely to support pro-China camp, the pan-Blue candidates (Chen et al. 2009). Also, those who supported the term "1992 Consensus" and a broader scope of cross-Strait exchanges tended to support the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, henceforth, KMT)'s Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 presidential election (Tang 2013). Tsai and Chen (2015) measure the "China factor" by assessing the public's evaluation of the Chinese government's friendliness toward Taiwan. The more people perceive mainland China as unfriendly, the greater their concern about China's political and economic threats, and thus the stronger their incentives of participation in social movements against the China factor are. Wu and Liao (2015) argue that people's assessment on China's influence has complicated the role of national identity cleavage and become a major mobilization factor in the electoral politics. In short, the impact of the "China factor" on political behavior combines how people assess the attractiveness of China's economic benefits

to Taiwan and how they evaluate China's military and diplomatic threats toward Taiwan.

To explain the variations of democratic support, I propose to investigate how the citizens' evaluation on China, especially the negative impacts, are associated with people's assessment of democracy. Existing studies show that many people evaluate the political system and make a contrast between democracy and authoritarian alternatives (Erhardt, Wamsler, and Freitag 2021; Malka et al. 2022). In particular, people's assessment of democracy versus autocratic alternatives may come from comparing Taiwan with other autocracies, especially from China, because of the close socioeconomic ties.

I hypothesize that people's perception on China, as an alternative model of political system, is significantly and reversely associated with their attitudes on democratic support. This might be particularly true for the younger generations or those who have not experienced the authoritarian ruling. It is indeed that younger generations have consensus on the identity issue as more and more people take the Taiwanese identity for granted (Lin 2015; Lin, Cheng, and Wang 2020), but polls also point out that in the past decade, more young people think Taiwan and China are similar in language and culture.[5] Some people become more likely to have exposures to new patterns of informational acquisition, such as the short videos and new apps online. Thus, they may be more likely to see China's propaganda and the positive images about China.

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[5] See the polls by My-Formosa, March 2023. Available at: http://www.my-formosa.com/DOC_193966.htm.

On the other hand, according to the same poll by My-Formosa, not only for the younger generations, there are still more than 60% of people think that the two sides "share similar history and culture." The "authoritarian nostalgia" is another factor that particularly shows up for the elder generation (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007), while some people want to go back to the authoritarian good old days in their memory. That is, there might be mixed effects from different generations or age cohorts, depending on individuals' attitudes toward authoritarianism. The previous findings about generation gap and the age effect may no longer exist given that the China factor becomes more salient.

In recent years, the China factor has become even more salient, especially under the U.S.-China strategic competition and the impact of the 2019 Hong Kong mass protest (Hung 2022). For example, In the survey of the China Impact Studies conducted by the "China Factor Task Force" at Taiwan's Academia Sinica, there is a question asking "In cross-Straits relations, some people think economic interest is more important, others think national security is more important, which one do you think is more important?" Since their first survey in 2013, the results have always been economic interest greater than national security. In the 2019 survey (Chen 2023), however, it was the first time that there are more respondents saying national security is more important than economic interest, 62.0% versus 31.9%.

People in Taiwan witnessed how China's new National Security Law terminated the "one country two systems." On the other hand, the U.S.' China policy switched from "engagement" to "competition," marked by the introduction of the Indo-Pacific

Strategy. The U.S. is engaged in a global competition with China, especially in promoting democratic values.[6] At the core of this competition is the clash between the main values of China and the U.S. On one hand, there is the American commitment to democratic principles, individual rights, the rule of law, and the free market; on the other hand, while China strongly controls the politics and the economy using an authoritarian model that often suppresses dissent and freedom of expression with a state-capitalist model for the market (Chu et al. 2022). By emphasizing democratic values and working with like-minded partners globally, the U.S. seeks to counter China's alternative vision and demonstrate the importance of a democratic alliance.

In particular, after the Trump administration proposed the Indo-Pacific Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense 2019), focusing on aligning with democratic allies to defend freedom and prosperity, it clearly defines China as one of the most prominent threats to peace and stability. President Biden continues the Indo-Pacific Strategy and explicitly prioritizes the competition with China-suggesting that "a big task of his administration was to prove anew that the American model of democratic capitalism works and is superior to the authoritarian system imposed on China by Xi Jinping."[7]

Many analysts frame the U.S. versus China strategic competition into a context of democracy versus autocracy rivalry

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[6] See President Biden's note at his first news conference as the president. "Biden Defines His Underlying Challenge With China: 'Prove Democracy Works'." *The New York Times*, Mar. 26, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html.

[7] Ibid.

(Hung 2022; Kroenig 2020). In Taiwan, this has also become a salient issue. Surveys show that people's perception of the U.S., whether to choose sides between the U.S. and China, and the diplomatic relationship with the two great powers, all become significant factors in the dynamics of party politics (Wu et al. 2023). In particular, the pan-Blue supporters with party identification with the KMT, the People First Party (henceforth, PFP), and the New Party, and people who are favoring unification with China have a significantly higher tendency of choosing China as an ally (Lin and Wu 2019). On the other hand, the pan-Green supporters with party identification with the Democratic Progress Party (henceforth, DPP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (henceforth, TSU), the New Power Party, and people who support Taiwan independence, tend to feel positive about the U.S.' commitment to Taiwan (Wu and Lin 2019). In Taiwan's party politics, especially during the electoral campaigns, we often see debates on the foreign policies on whether Taiwan should "keep distance from the U.S.", from the pan-Blue camp, or staying closer to the democratic alliances led by the U.S., from the ruling DPP and the pan-Green side. Taken together, I hypothesize that citizens who are more aware of the China factor, who have negative views on China, and who have positive views on the U.S. tend to be more supportive of the democratic system.

III. Research Design

A. Hypotheses

To examine the democratic support in Taiwan, this study mainly hypothesizes that people who are concerned about the

negative impacts of political interaction with China should value democracy more than those who do not put national security as a priority. The reason is straightforward. The ultimate goal of the PRC government is to annex Taiwan, which means that democracy no longer exists. While China is the main source of threat to Taiwan's democratic ways of life, people who recognize such a threat should be more supportive of democratic principles.

Furthermore, in the context of the democracy versus autocracy duel, Taiwan maintains a close relationship with the U.S. Since 2018, the U.S. initiated a trade war against China and then introduced the Indo-Pacific Strategy which transformed the long-term "engagement policy" into strategic competition. In Taiwan's party politics and electoral campaigns, it becomes more and more salient that people discuss whether Taiwan should "pick a side" between China and the U.S., while the latter has been framed as a democratic alliance. I hypothesize that people who have positive views of the U.S. and who have negative views of China tend to be more supportive of the democratic system.

B. Data

This study uses two surveys to test the hypotheses. The first study utilizes the China Impact Survey 2016 (Chang 2018), a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei. The population is citizens who are at least 18 years old. The sample size is 1226. In the second study, I use data from the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (henceforth, TEDS) (Chen 2021), hereafter the TEDS data. The face-to-face interview project was conducted

between January and May, 2021, with sample size of 3547. All data are nationally representative.

The rationale of choosing the two datasets is two-fold. First, on the timing of the survey, I aim to compare the public opinion before and after 2018. It is the year of the data used for the latest studies of Taiwanese democratic support (Hsiao and Yu 2020; Lin 2021). I want to update people's attitudes of democratic support after 2018, and fill in the gap on the lack of study for the China factor and try to find out the factors behind the generational gap. Also, data before 2018 can be used to make a comparison to Foa and Mounk's (2016) seminal study of global democratic deconsolidation. After the Sunflower Movement in 2014, the democracy versus autocracy issue became more salient for the younger generations and it is possible that Taiwan showed resistance to the global trend of declining support for democracy. Furthermore, choosing data from the end of the Ma Yin-jeou administration and the end of the first term of Tsai Ing-wen administration provides an opportunity to examine whether partisanship makes difference in the attitudes.

Second, I choose these two different datasets because they include the most relevant variables, especially the China factor, and they can complement each other. The China Impact Survey has more direct questions on the China factor, while the TEDS data include a range of relevant variables that we can put in the model for control. Therefore, I use two different surveys.

C. Variables

The dependent variable, democratic support, is measured by whether the respondent believes that democracy is the best political system even when compared with authoritarianism. The wording is as follows: Which statement do you agree with? (1) democracy is always the best political system, (2) sometimes autocracy is better than democracy. The respondent can also choose "to me, there is no difference to choose between political systems." I code the dependent variable as binary, where people who agree with the statement that democracy is always the best are coded as 1, and otherwise 0.

Independent variable is the China factor, mainly measured by respondents' evaluation on China. In the China Impact Survey, The China factor consists of two main variables: evaluation on the government of China, and values for national sovereignty. First, I adopt the question that asks respondent to have an overall evaluation of the Chinese government. The coding of this variable is 1-4 ordinal, from very bad, bad, good, to very good. Second, the national sovereignty question asks people: "when it comes to negotiations for the cross-Strait exchanges, which principle is more important to you, economic interests or national sovereignty?" This is a binary variable as those who value national sovereignty is coded

as 1.[8] For the main variables of the China factor in the TEDS survey for Study 2, I use the evaluation toward China (as a foreign country), ranged from 1-10, as larger number represents more positive views. I also use the variable on the evaluation of the U.S., Using the sames coding as the evaluation toward China.

For the control variables, first, I include the age variable in the models in both studies. Also, I include a generation variable using 1981 as a cut-off point.[9] I label the post-1981 generation as the democratic generation. While most previous studies on democratic support focus on the generation gap, and the worldwide focus in on whether the younger generation is less supportive of liberal democracy, the variables of age and generation are still essential in

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[8] The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for raising the issue of operationalization and the selection of question items. Indeed, there are several items that could be used to measure the China factor. For example, the 1992 Consensus question assesses respondents' attitudes toward the 1992 Consensus and exchanges with China. Additionally, there are questions specifically addressing people's perceptions of economic security regarding Taiwan's relationship with China. In this study, I selected the questions evaluating the Chinese government and the choice between national sovereignty and economic interests, as they are fundamental to the China factor. The evaluation of China is also very similar to the question used in the second study. I used other factors, such as the 1992 Consensus question, as a robustness check; however, they became insignificant when the evaluation and national sovereignty questions were included. Therefore, these two questions can be considered direct measures of the China factor.

[9] For a review of Taiwan's generational politics and different measurements, see Lin (2015). For the year 1981 as a cut-off point, people who were born after this year would enter elementary school in or after 1987, the year of lifting the Martial Law. The year is similar to other studies such as Chen (2010) in which the cutting point is entering college before 2001, roughly around 1982 to 83. The year 1981 also matches other surveys, for example, Taiwan Social Change Survey, in which the year counts from every first year of a 10-year cohort.

the study.

Other control variables include: (1) *Education level*, coded from 1 no education to 5 college or above level. (2) *Personal income* (ordinal from 1 to 14). (3) Father as *Mainlander* (originally from China).[10] (4) Taiwanese *identity* dummy (identify oneself as only Taiwanese, not Chinese). (5) *Party identification* (self-identified as pan-Blue, pan-Green, and independent.[11] (6) Preferences on unification and independence (*tondu*). In study 1, I create a dummy variable using the conditional preference variable (Wu 2005; Wu and Liao 2015): support Taiwan's independence even if China will attack Taiwan.[12] (7) *Democratic evaluation*, asking how do respondents evaluate the performance of Taiwanese democracy in general. I recode this as continuous from 1 to 4, from "very bad" to "very good." (8) *Evaluation of the incumbent government* (dummy for disapproval). And (9) *Authoritarian value*, which asks people whether they support a strong leader who can bypass the due process

[10] Gender is not an item of the survey in the China Impact survey.

[11] The pan-Blue parties include KMT, the PFP, and the New Party (NP), which is pro-unification and supports expanding cross-Strait exchanges. On the other hand, the pan-Green parties consist of the DPP, the TSU, the New Power Party, and other pro-independence parties. These parties often pursue a more independent status for Taiwan and being cautious on interacting with China.

[12] In the China Impact Survey, there is no measurement on the 6-type independence-unification preference. The conditional preference is a direct alternative to the traditional measurement. Wu (2005) labels those who support Taiwan independence even if China attacks as "Taiwanese nationalist."

sometime in order to pursue efficiency or finish the job.[13] This is an ordinal variable ranged from 1 to 4 and a higher point represents the tendency toward authoritarianism.[14]

There are some additional controls in Study 2. First, I use the traditional 6-type unification and independence preference and make dummy for pro-independence, including independence immediately and toward independence. Also, I include several additional control variables, including respondents' satisfaction with President Tsai Ing-wen (dummy for disapproval), gender (male dummy), household income (ordinal from 1 to 10), living in great Taipei area, internal and external political efficacy dummy (positive views on whether one can influence the political system), self-evaluation of social class (self-evaluation of 1 to 10, from lower classes to higher classes), pro-China newspaper readers (those who take China Times and United Daily as a main source of newspaper), general interests on politics (dummy for those who answer very interested and somewhat interested in politics), and assessment on whether the

[13] Authoritarian values and support for democracy may indeed be closely related concepts, but they are still different. Support for democracy refers to how people choose between a democratic system and an authoritarian one, while authoritarian values pertain to a leader's style of governance and the degree to which they adhere to the rule of law. I used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to measure multicollinearity between variables, and when this variable is included in the model, there is no issues so far.

[14] The question wording in the China Impact Survey is "do you agree with the statement that democratic due process can be ignored sometimes so that the leader can lead us to pursue efficiency?" In the TEDS survey, I use a similar questionnaire item that asks whether respondents support idea that "a powerful leader who can bypass some rules (even purposely misinterpret rules) in order to finish jobs." The coding is ordinal from 1 to 4, the same with the Study 1.

political system is doing well on dealing with inequality problems (dummy for disapproval). For the party identity variable, in the data of 2021, I include Ko Wen-je's Taiwan People's Party (henceforth, TPP) as a dummy in addition to pan-Blue and pan-Green.

In the Appendix, there is a table summarizing all of the variables and operationalization in each study (Appendix 2). Also, for the descriptive distribution of all variables, please see the appendix (Appendix 2 and 3).

IV. Analysis: Study 1

Table 1 presents the results of Study 1. Model (1) and Model (2) include only the China factor and basic controls without variables of political attitudes, while Model (3) and Model (4) include all the variables on attitudes as control. For detailed coefficients for controls, please see the appendix (Appendix 4).

The models show that the China factor, both the evaluation on China's government and people who value national security more than economic development, are significantly tied to democratic support. In the full model, two findings stand out. First, when people's evaluation on Chinese government increases for one level, the odds of supporting democracy decrease to 0.741, a 25.9% minus ($e^{-0.299}$). Second, when choosing between national sovereignty and economic exchanges, people who value sovereignty have odds of democratic support 1.513 times higher than those who choose economic exchanges as priority ($e^{0.414}$). That is, there is a 51.3% difference of odds between people choosing economy and national security. We see that the China factors do have significant effects on the democratic support.

Table 1 Logit Model of Democratic Support (Study 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
China Factor				
Evaluation of China	-.577	-.436	-.342	-.299
	(.082)***	(.088)***	(.103)**	(.105)**
National Security		.796		.414
		(.143)***		(.162)*
Controls				
Education	− ***	− **	− ***	− **
Personal income	−	−	−	+
Age	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Democratic generation (cutoff: 1981)	−	−	−	−
Father Mainlander	−	−	+	+
Dissatisfy with democracy			− ***	− ***
Dissatisfy with government			−	−
Authoritarian value			− ***	− ***
Pro-independence			+ **	+ **
Taiwanese identity			+ *	+
Pan-Blue			+	+
Pan-Green			+	+
Observations	1059	1026	1012	987

Source: China Impact Survey 2016 (Chang 2018).

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Standard Errors in parenthesis.

The $GVIF^{1/(2\cdot df)}$ of all variables are smaller than 1.2, which indicates no collinearity problem.

For the control variables, we see that age is positively associated with democratic support, while the post-1981 generation does not have different attitudes toward democracy compared with pre-1981 counterparts. These results partly reflect that young people tend to have lower support for democracy, similar to the worldwide phenomenon. Also, Model (3) and (4) show that when adding authoritarian values, the coefficients of the variables for other factors do not change. Authoritarian values in all models have significantly negative effects on democratic support, while it does not change the outcome of the main variables. Another negative factor is the assessment of the performance of democracy. People who are dissatisfied with the function of democracy tend to support the alternative systems. We can also observe that education is a significantly factor, as highly educated people are less supportive of democracy. This result may need further research.

Last but not least and not surprisingly, people who support Taiwan independence are more supportive of democracy. This is because people who advocate for Taiwan independence may feel a stronger sense of community and tend to prefer the current democratic political system in Taiwan, as opposed to the political system that would be in place after unification with China. In the models, other factors only have limited impacts.

V. Analysis: Study 2

In Study 2, Table 2 shows the results for all models of democratic support. Model (1) and Model (2) are the basic model with demographic variables as controls, while Model (4) and (5) include all control variables including various political attitudes.

The detailed coefficients for all variables are listed in the appendix (Appendix 5).

For the China factor, we see the evaluation of China and the U.S. significantly influence the attitudes of democratic support. In Model (1) and (3), evaluation on China is negatively and significantly associated with support for democracy. Model (2) and (4) show that people who give the U.S. a higher score are significantly more supportive of the democratic system. Both evaluation of the U.S. and China influence perceptions of the democratic system. In the full model, an increase of 1 point on the preference of China leads to an 8.2% drop ($e^{-0.085}$) on odds of democratic support. For the U.S. rating, an increase of 1-point results in a 11.8 increase ($e^{0.112}$) on odds of democratic support.

For the control variables, age is not significant in the models, although the democratic generation (people who are born after 1981) shows lower support for democracy. Dissatisfaction of the performance of democracy has a significantly negative effects on the democratic system, as we know that the performance of the whole system is still the most direct index for people to weigh their support for the system. Furthermore, when respondents think that the inequality problem is not well-addressed, then they become less supportive of democracy. This result is in accordance with Lin (2021), as people do care about the sociotropic outcomes of a system.

For other positive factors, people who are more interested in politics and with pro-independence attitudes are more supportive of democracy. For the partisan factors, TPP supporters show their passion for democracy, as the supporters might think that there is

indeed a new option besides the traditional major parties. Also, male respondents are more likely to express their support for democracy. However, in the data of 2021, education is positively associated with democratic support, an opposite result compared with the 2016 data from the China Impact Survey. Why do the highly-educated people show less support on democracy in the 2016 data while more support in the 2021 data needs further research.

The non-significant factors also worth some attention. A good sign for democracy is that, similar to the result from the 2018 data, evaluation on the current government does not have significant impacts. That is, people can evaluate the system independently, instead of change their mind depending on the incumbents from different parties. Internal and external efficacy are both insignificant. Another positive sign for democracy is about the authoritarian values. The variable of supporting a strong leader who can bypass the law to finish jobs is not significantly associated with democratic support.

In general, people's overall evaluation of China and their overall evaluation of the United States both significantly influence their assessment and support for democratic systems. This confirms our research hypothesis. Looking at other variables, we find that people's evaluation of the performance of the democratic system, particularly its ability to address income inequality, is also a significant influencing factor.

Table 2 Logit Model of Democratic Support (Study 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
China Factor				
Evaluation of China	-.177	-.163	-.077	-.085
	(.017)***	(.018)***	(.021)***	(.022)***
Evaluation of US		.192		.112
		(.020)***		(.022)***
Controls				
Education	＋ ***	＋ *	＋ ***	＋ **
Gender (male)	＋ ***	＋ ***	＋ ***	＋ ***
Personal income	－	＋	－	－
Age	－	－	－	－
Democratic generation (cutoff: 1981)	－	－	－ *	－ *
Father Mainlander	－ **	－	－	－
Taipei Area	＋	＋	＋	＋
Dissatisfy with democracy			－ ***	－ ***
Dissatisfy with Tsai Ing-wen			－	－
Authoritarian value			＋	＋
Pro-independence			＋ ***	＋ **
Taiwanese identity			＋	＋
Pan-Blue			＋	＋
TPP			＋ *	＋ *
Social Class Status			－	－
Interest in politics			＋ ***	＋ ***
Inequality perception			－ ***	－ ***
Internal efficacy			－	－
External efficacy			＋	＋
Pro-China newspaper reader			－	－
Observations	2907	2950	2773	2770

Source: TEDS 2021 (Chen 2021).

Note: * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$. For control variables, * = $p < 0.05$. The $GVIF^{1/(2 \cdot df)}$ of all variables are smaller than 1.2, which indicates no collinearity problem.

VI. Conclusion

Democratic backsliding in both the quantity of democratic countries and the quality of governance and protection of civil liberties is one of the major concerns for academics, think tanks, and media globally. In particular, since Diamond's (2015) warning about the global democratic recession, more and more evidence seems to indicate that liberal democracy is in doom and gloom. Studies have already illustrated that the publics' support for democracy is essential for the consolidation of democracies (Wu and Chang 2019). Thus, we need more studies on citizens' attitudes toward democracy and the approaches to amend potential deficiencies of the system.

This study utilizes two waves of survey to revisit the democratic support in Taiwan and I find that the China factor has become one of the most significant factors that shape citizens' assessment of the democratic system. In the 2016 data, I find that people who value national sovereignty in the relationship with China, and those who negatively evaluate the Chinese government tend to express support for democracy. In the 2021 data, it shows that citizens' positive views of the U.S. significantly lead to a higher level of support on democracy, while a supportive view of China results in a negative view of the democratic system. We can see the impact of the U.S.-China strategic competition and the framework of the democracy and autocracy duel does influence people's perception of the preference of political systems.

Although Taiwan's macro-level democratic performance shows no signs of setback, according to the indices such as the

Freedom House and Polity IV, tracing the individual attitudes is still essential. In Taiwan's party politics, the China policy is always one of the most salient issues. In recent years, especially after 2016, the Taiwanese government always emphasizes the values of democracy and the integrity of Taiwan's sovereignty.[15] Under the great power competition between China and the U.S., Taiwan adopts policies that strengthening the linkage with "like-minded countries," including the U.S., Japan, South East Asian countries, and many other allies. On the other hand, many actors go to the other way. For example, pro-China media and some politicians keep promoting closer ties with China and "more distance with the U.S.."[16] As the competition between the U.S. and China continues and China keeps pressuring Taiwan by various approaches, the China factor in Taiwan will become even more salient.

In this regard, the policy implication of this study is quite straightforward. For democracies, in the competition against the authoritarian diffusion, citizens have to come up with ways to consolidate democratic institutions and the democratic values. Brownlee (2017) argues that the reach of authoritarian powers is limited, while democratic support or recession are affected more

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[15] For example, see President Tsai Ing-wen's National Day Speech of 2021. Available at: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202110105005.aspx.

[16] For example, in the 2024 Presidential Election, both candidates from the opposition parties emphasize that Taiwan should keep an "equal distance" from China and the U.S., implying that the ruling DPP is "too close" to the U.S.. They all support a closer tie with China, including re-signing a trade deal that was blocked by the civil society, the Sunflower Movement, in 2014. In the editorials of the main newspapers, including the United Daily and China Times, many still urging an "equal distance" but emphasizing closer ties with China. An example: https://udn.com/news/story/7241/7769047.

by local political conditions than the autocratic developments. However, in the case of Taiwan, the China factor are taking place in various fields (Fong, Wu, and Nathan 2021), which means that the two dimensions of local politics and authoritarian influence are not independent to each other. Further studies are needed. In particular, we need to find out how different groups of people view democracy and the superpower competition. Qualitative studies and surveys with detailed items of attitudes are necessary. How to trace the impact of the China factor on individuals' political attitudes as well as on the institutions at various levels are essential research agenda for not only Taiwanese politics, but also studies of democracy and political behaviors worldwide.

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Appendix 1 Studies of Taiwanese Democratic Support

Measurement	Study	Age or generational effect
Direct (democratic support)	Hsiao and Yu 2020	Younger generations (20-39) have higher (but not significant) odds of democratic support
	Huang 2011	Age is positively related to democratic support
	Chang 2011	U-shape between age and democratic support
	Yu and Hsiao 2007	Post-1992 generation (<20-yr in 1992) are more supportive of democracy, but also more supportive of authoritarianism than older generations
Multiple (democratic support and related values)	Lin 2021	Age is positively related to democratic support
	Lin 2015	1. Younger generations (10-yr cohort) have higher values 2. The social movement generation (born 1961-1975) is especially anti-authoritarian
	Chang 2011	Reverse U-shape between age and democratic values
	Chen 2010	1991-college students have higher democratic values than 2001-college students
	Pao 2009	The youngest generation (born after 1976) has highest "leadership complex" (anti-democratic value)

Source: The author.

Appendix 2 Main Variables in Each Study

	Variables	Questions and operationalization
Study 1	Democratic support	Do you agree with the statement that democracy is always the best political system, or do you agree that sometimes autocracies are better than democracies? (binary for support democracy is the best)
	China factor	1. How do you evaluate China's government? (1 to 4 ordinal scale: very bad, bad, good, very good) 2. For the cross-strait negotiation, which one do you think is more important, Taiwan's economic interest or national sovereignty? (binary for national security)
	Generation/age	1. Generation: Cutting point of 1981; 2. Age
	Education level	Continuous coding. 1 no school or elementary school, 2 junior high school, 3 senior high school (including vocational), 4 junior college, 5 university or above.
	Personal Income	Ordinal: 1 no income, 14 more than 200K monthly income
	Father's ethnic origin	Originally from China (dummy for Mainlander)
	Party identification	Self-identified (voting record) as pan-Blue (KMT, NP, PFP), pan-Green (DPP, TSU, TIP)
	Pro-independence	Conditional preference: independence (support Taiwan's independence even if China will attack Taiwan)
	(Dis)Satisfaction with democracy	What is your overall evaluation of Taiwan's democracy? (1 to 4, from "very bad" to "very good")
	(Dis)Satisfaction with government (incumbent)	What is your evaluation of Taiwan's government? (dummy for disapproval)

Appendix 2 Main Variables in Each Study (Continued)

	Variables	Questions and operationalization
	Self-identity	Do you self-identify yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both? (dummy for Taiwanese identity)
	Authoritarian value	Do you agree with the statement that democratic due process (e.g., policies should be passed by the national or local congresses) can be ignored sometimes so that the leader can lead us to pursue efficiency? (1 to 4 ordinal: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree)
Study 2	Democratic support	Do you agree with the statement that democracy is always the best system compared with other types of (non-democratic) political systems? (binary for support)
	China factor (US evaluation)	Please rate from 0-10 for how you feel about the country (China/US).
	Generation/age	1. Generation: Cutting point of 1981; 2. Age
	Authoritarian value	Do you agree with the statement that a powerful leader who can bypass some rules (even purposely misinterpret rules) in order to finish jobs is good for Taiwan? (1 to 4 ordinal: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree)
	Education level	Ordinal: 1 no school or elementary school, 2 junior high school, 3 senior high school (including vocational), 4 junior college, 5 university or above.
	Gender	Male dummy
	Household income	Ordinal: 1 (below NTD 30k) to 10 (above NTD 160K)
	Father's ethnic origin	Originally from China (dummy for Mainlander)
	District	Living in great Taipei area (dummy for Taipei City and Xinbei City)

Appendix 2 Main Variables in Each Study (Continued)

	Variables	Questions and operationalization
	Party identification	Self-identified as pan-Blue (KMT, NP, PFP), pan-Green (DPP, TSU, TIP, NPP), and independent; Taiwan People's Party dummy.
	Pro-independence	Traditional 6-type unification and independence preference: dummy for pro-independence (including independence immediately and toward independence)
	Self-identity	Do you self-identify yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both? (dummy for Taiwanese identity).
	(Dis)Satisfaction with incumbent	What is your evaluation for the overall performance of the Tsai Ing-wen administration? (dummy for disapproval)
	(Dis)Satisfaction with democracy	In general, what is your evaluation for the overall performance of Taiwan's democracy (dummy for disapproval)
	Political efficacy	External efficacy: Do you agree with the statement that we the people cannot influence the behaviors of the government. Internal efficacy: Do you agree with the statement that we cannot understand the complicated situation of the politics. (dummy, positive views on whether one can influence or understand the political system)
	Self-evaluation of social class	Self-evaluation of 1 to 10, from lower classes to higher classes
	Pro-China Newspaper readers	Dummy for those who take China Times and United Daily as a main source of newspaper
	General interests in politics	In general, do you feel interested in politics? (dummy for those who answer very and somewhat interested)

Appendix 2 Main Variables in Each Study (Continued)

	Variables	Questions and operationalization
	Assessment on inequality problems	In general, how do you evaluate the performance of our political system on ensuring all groups are treated fair in the society? (dummy for disapproval)

Source: The author.

Appendix 3 Summary of Variables for Study 1

	(N=1226)	mean	sd	min	max
	Democratic Support	0.578	0.494	0	1
Dependent variable	China's government rating	2.168	0.856	1	4
	National security	0.474	0.500	0	1
Control variable	Democratic generation	0.104	0.306	0	1
	Authoritarian Value	2.071	0.916	1	4
	Education	3.692	1.285	1	5
	Dissatisfy democracy	0.372	0.484	1	4
	Pro-independence	0.501	0.500	0	1
	Dissatisfy with government	0.546	0.498	0	1
	Personal income	5.584	2.928	1	14
	Father Mainlander	0.126	0.332	0	1
	Taiwanese identity	0.702	0.457	0	1
	Pan-Blue/KMT	0.401	0.490	0	1
	Pan-Green/DPP	0.281	0.449	0	1

Source: China Impact Survey 2016 (Chang 2018).

Appendix 4 Control Variables of Study 1

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant		.625	.320	1.214	.936
		(.555)	(.488)	(.634)	(.651)
Controls	Education	-.233	-.217	-.273	-.255
		(.073)**	(.069)**	(.076)***	(.077)**
	Personal income	-.007	-.010	.002	.004
		(.026)	(.025)	(.028)	(.029)
	Age	.033	.031	.042	.041
		(.007)***	(.007)**	(.007)***	(.007)***
	Democratic Generation	-.287	-.582	-.599	-.699
	(Cutoff point 1981)	(.374)	(.328)	(.373)	(.377)
	Father Mainlander	-.321	-.193	.007	.019
		(.205)	(.200)	(.225)	(.229)
	Dissatisfy with democracy			-1.024	-.967
				(.161)***	(.164)***
	Dissatisfy with government			-.084	-.123
				(-.167)	(.169)
	Authoritarian value			-.613	-.582
				(.085)***	(.086)***
	Pro-independence			.529	.452
				(.155)**	(.158)**
	Taiwanese identity			.371	.349
				(.179)**	(.185)
	Pan-Blue/KMT			.118	.116
				(.188)	(.192)
	Pan-Green/DPP			.106	.036
				(.200)	(.205)

Source: China Impact Survey 2016 (Chang 2018).

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Standard Errors in parenthesis.

Appendix 5 Summary of Variables for Study 2

	(N=3547)	mean	sd	min	max
Dependent variable	Democratic support	0.618	0.486	0	1
Independent Variable	China rating	3.394	2.398	0	10
	US rating	5.683	2.189	0	10
Control variable	Age	49.82	17.35	18	99
	Democratic generation	0.332	0.471	0	1
	Authoritarian Value	2.130	0.648	1	4
	Education	3.542	1.402	1	5
	Dissatisfy democracy	0.195	0.396	0	1
	Inequality evaluation	0.440	0.496	0	1
	Internal efficacy	0.322	0.467	0	1
	External efficacy	0.700	0.458	0	1
	Red media	0.202	0.401	0	1
	Pro-independence	0.353	0.478	0	1
	Dissatisfy Tsai Ing-wen	0.317	0.465	0	1
	Gender-male	0.492	0.500	0	1
	Household income	4.480	2.914	1	10
	Father Mainlander	0.099	0.299	0	1
	District-Taipei	0.291	0.454	0	1
	Interests in politics	0.392	0.488	0	1
	Taiwanese identity	0.619	0.486	0	1
	Social status	3.379	0.797	1	5
	Pan-Blue/KMT	0.189	0.391	0	1
	Pan-Green/DPP	0.297	0.457	0	1
	TPP	0.040	0.198	0	1

Source: TEDS 2021 (Chen 2021).

Appendix 6 Control Variables of Study 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	.983	-.036	.579	.107
	(.316)**	(.343)	(.490)	(.509)
Education	.126	.112	.150	.134
	(.038)***	(.039)**	(.044)**	(.045)***
Gender-male	.449	.431	.487	.467
	(.080)***	(.082)***	(.088)***	(.089)***
Household income	-.000	.001	-.017	-.018
	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)
Age	-.008	-.009	-.007	-.008
	(.004)	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)
Democratic generation	-.129	-.242	-.313	-.355
	(.129)	(.141)	(.148)*	(.150)*
Father Mainlander	-.407	-.219	-.156	-.112
	(.129)**	(.134)	(.144)	(.147)
District-Taipei	.091	.109	.077	.093
	(.089)	(.091)	(.096)	(.098)
Dissatisfy democracy			-.802	-.735
			(.116)***	(.118)***
Dissatisfy Tsai Ing-wen			-.195	-.106
			(.116)	(.118)
Authoritarian value			.108	.110
			(.068)	(.069)
Pro-independence			.413	.357
			(.106)***	(.107)**
Taiwanese identity			.161	.124
			(.106)	(.108)

Appendix 6 Control Variables of Study 2 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pan-Blue			.117	.133
			(.126)	(.128)
TPP			.534	.553
			(.222)*	(.222)*
Social class			-.039	-.050
			(.061)	(.062)
Interests in politics			.358	.342
			(.094)***	(.095)***
Inequality perception			-.482	-.465
			(.100)***	(.101)***
Internal efficacy			-.099	-.094
			(.097)	(.098)
External efficacy			.076	.077
			(.100)	(.101)
o-China newspaper reader			-.166	-.145
			(.112)	(.113)

Source: TEDS 2021 (Chen 2021).

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Standard Errors in parenthesis.

再探台灣民眾的民主支持態度：中國因素之影響

陳方隅

東吳大學
政治學系
助理教授

摘要

近幾年，全球自由民主似乎出現退潮，尤其是年輕世代對民主的支持度下降。在台灣是否也出現同樣的狀況？我們可看到「威權擴散」成爲顯學，特別是在中國與美國進入戰略競爭關係之下，民主與獨裁之爭讓人們更爲有感。本研究聚焦在台灣民眾的民主支持（是否認同民主政治絕對比獨裁體制還要好），尤其是檢視「中國因素」的影響力。我們想知道的是，以台灣在幾乎所有全球自由民主評比指標都名列前茅的狀況下來看，是否有辦法抵抗威權價值的擴散呢？本研究利用中國效應調查（2016）和台灣選舉與民主化調查（2021）的資料來檢視民眾的民主支持態度。從 2016 年的資料來看，本文發現中國因素確實顯著影響人們的政治態度，如果民眾對中國政府的評價較低、在兩岸關係當中較爲注重台灣的主權安全，則會傾向支持民主體制比威權更好。而在 2021 年的資料當中，本文發現中國因素的影響仍然顯著，尤其是對中國與對美國的評價。當人們對中國的評價愈高，愈不支持民主政治；而對美國的評價愈高，則是愈認爲民主比獨裁還要好。也就是說，在美中強權競爭、且被形容爲民主與獨裁的對抗之下，台灣民眾對美國與中國的評價，直

接影響了對民主政治的支持程度。本文認爲，中國因素對我們的生活影響既深且廣，因此，我們都有必要更加了解威權擴散的途徑，才能更有效地共同鞏固民主政治。

關鍵字：民主支持、中國因素、民主倒退、威權擴散